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ARTICLES
GATT 1994: FOOL'S GOAL?
CLAIRE MOORE DICKERSON*
In this volume, the Editors of the Journal of Legal Commentary
have united an impressive panel of experts on international trade
generally, and on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) in particular. Some have addressed its theme and pur-
pose, and some discuss this theme and purpose as applied in prac-
tice. In order to help the reader situate these articles in context, I
am offering a brief summary of the theme and purpose of GATT,
and of the concepts manifested by GATT in its attempt to further
that theme and purpose. When appropriate, I refer specifically to
articles in this volume.
* Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law. Wellesley College, A.B. 1971;
Columbia University, J.D. 1974; New York University, LL.M. in Taxation 1981. Many
thanks to Alice R. Scott, St. John's University School of Law 1997, for her expert and
thoughtful assistance.
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I. THEME AND PURPOSE, AND FUNDAMENTAL IMPLEMENTING
CONCEPTS, OF GATT
A. Theme and Purpose of GATT
Having heard so much about General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT), what is its theme? GATT is a reflection of the cyni-
cal assumption that we humans, at least if acting collectively, will
behave only according to our perceived self-interest. If we are to
reorder behavior, we must first reorder perceived self-interest.
And, interestingly, we have to do it in such a way that the individ-
ual politicians' self-interest is respected, so that they will have an
incentive to convince their constituencies that GATT is in the na-
tion's collective self-interest.
If perceived self-interest is the theme of GATT, its purpose is to
create a vehicle that will allow the individual nations and their
populations to impose on themselves the discipline1 not to abuse
short-term opportunities at the expense of long-term benefits.
The Bunting paper' offers a historical perspective, but GATT's
long-term purpose is contained in the phrase mentioned by Profes-
sor Dillon in the context of environmental protection: comparative
advantage.' That is, GATT represents the member-nations' ac-
ceptance that comparative advantage can increase worldwide
prosperity.4 Comparative advantage stands for the proposition
that, even if one country can produce more efficiently a particular
product in absolute terms, it may be that the other country can
produce that product more efficiently than it can any other prod-
1 OMNIBUs TRADE AND COMPETITIVENESS AcT OF 1988, CoN. REPORT No. 576, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess., at 16-18 (1988) (stating that principal trade negotiating objective for unfair
trade practices was ". . . to improve the provisions of GATT ... in order to define, deter,
discourage the persistent use of, and otherwise discipline unfair trade practices having
adverse trade effects, including forms of subsidy . . . ."); see Curtis R. Reitz, Introduction:
International Economic Law, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 29, 31 (1996) (recognizing role of
overseer of international governments in disciplining themselves); see also BLACiKs LAw
DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990) (defining discipline in this context as "[ilnstruction, compre-
hending the communication of knowledge and training to observe and act in accordance
with rules and orders").
2 Gerald A. Bunting, GATT and the Evolution of the Global Trade System: A Historical
Perspective, 11 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL CoamnmNT. 505 (1996).
3 Sara Dillon, Trade and the Environment: A Challenge to the GATT/WTO Principle of
"Ever-Freer" Trade, 11 ST. JOHN's J. LEGAL Comzrr. 351, 356-57 (1996).
4 See, e.g., CHARLEs P. KINDLEBERGER, INTERNATIONAL EcoNoMIcs 17-21, 27, 33 (5th ed.
1973). The most famous, early proponent of comparative advantage was the 18th century
economist, David Ricardo. Id. He posited that a country would export the product in which
it had the greater (comparative) advantage and import the product in which it had a com-
parative disadvantage for maximum global efficiency. Id.
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uct. If the perspective taken is of the world as a whole, as opposed
to a nation or an even smaller, more fragmentary political subdivi-
sion, it is in the best interests of the collective to have the second
nation produce that particular product. However, in order for the
first country not to produce the particular product in competition
with the second country, the former will have to exercise disci-
pline, shunning relatively certain short-term gain in search of
greater, longer-term benefits for itself and, incidentally, for the
aggregation of world economies.5
That is a problem. Politicians seek to manipulate their constit-
uents' perception of self-interest: Ross Perot's argument against
free trade in another context was to call it a "giant sucking
sound,"6 referring to the loss of jobs by workers in the United
States. This compelling perspective was subsequently a focus of
Patrick Buchanan during his ultimately unsuccessful, but initially
spectacular, campaign for the 1996 Republican presidential nomi-
nation. Facing this rhetoric7 and an upcoming election, a politi-
cian would be hard pressed to ask constituents to give up the
short-term benefits of perceived job security for the greater, long-
5 See generally E. E. SCHATrSCHNEIDER, PoLrrics, PRESSURES AND THE TsAuR 31-66, 282-
93 (1963). In this 1935 study, Schattschneider concluded that interest groups had directly
and adversely influenced the tariff through the legislative process that resulted from the
disastrous Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930. Id. When short-term political gain dominates,
the legislative outcome can be unfortunate. Id.
6 Ross Perot, 1992 Presidential Debate #3, East Lansing, Michigan (October 19, 1992).
When discussing the North American Free Trade Agreement [hereinafter NAFTA], an
agreement that, like GATT, supports free trade, Perot suggested, "You implement NAFTA,
the Mexican trade agreement, where they pay people a dollar an hour, have no health care,
no retirement, no pollution controls, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera, and you're going to hear
a giant sucking sound of jobs being pulled out of this country right at a time when we need
the tax base to pay the debt and pay down the interest on the debt and get our house back
in order." Id.; see also Ross PEROT & PAT CHOATE, SAVE YOUR JOB SAVE OUR COUNTRY: WHY
NAFTA MUST BE STOPPED Now! 41 (1993).
7 See Nancy Hill-Holtzman, Dueling Presidential Campaigns Make Local Stops; Pat
Buchanan: A Thousand Show Up to Support the Candidate, Who Vows to Continue in the
Race But Skirts Third-Party Speculation, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1996, at B1 (reporting con-
tinued opposition to GATT by Pat Buchanan during his campaign for Republican nomina-
tion in 1996 presidential election); see also Clifford Cobb, Ted Halstead & Jonathan Rowe,
Hear Our Fiscal Scream!, STAR-TRm. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Oct. 2, 1995, at A5 (noting
opposition to GATT, organized by environmentalists, anti-corporate populists and social
conservatives); Douglas Turner, Region's Success Under GATT Depends on Taxes, Regula-
tion, BUFFALO NEWS, Jan. 22, 1995 (listing GATT opponents such as Ross Perot, Pat
Buchanan and Ralph Nader as well as organized labor unions). For essentially the same
result in the context of NAFTA, see Howard Fineman, The Phony War, Bob Dole us. Bill
Clinton Politicking Will Turn Off Voters, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 25, 1996 (naming Ralph Nader
and Jesse Jackson along with Perot and Buchanan as alliance that opposed NAFTA).
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term good of anticipated world-wide prosperity-' It is, indeed, in
recognition of the political difficulties that the United States Con-
gress adopted a streamlined system, dubbed "fasttrack," for the
adoption of international trade agreements.9 While fasttrack has
expired, its one-time existence embodies a recognition that the
micro pressures on politicians are inconsistent with the adoption
of agreements that, by definition, require the sacrifice of certain
short-term benefits in favor of presumed longer-term ones. 10
What would happen if the discipline were not externally im-
posed by an international agreement like GATT? Would all long-
term benefits be unattainable? Would we be relegated to the
chaos of short-term gains? Not necessarily. The concept is that
individual nations must deal with each other as trading partners
on an infinitely iterative basis. This means that international
trade is a perfect situation for game theory: nations will tend to
want to cooperate, because the consequences of retaliation are too
dire." However, game theory when dealing with multiparty
transactions is far more complicated than the simple bilateral co-
operation model. Besides, if game theory really worked predict-
ably and reliably we would not need commercial law, courts or bai-
liffs. Therefore, an external discipline is necessary if nations and
8 See Business: The Editorial that Spurred GATT Debate, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 28, 1994, at
B5 (commenting on Sen. Ernest F. Hollings' exercise of right to delay GATT bill as chair-
man of Commerce Committee); see also Keith Bradsher, NAFTA Hit for Delaying GATT
OK, SAN DIEGO UNION & Tam., Apr. 6, 1993, at C1 (noting that GATT was scheduled to
reach floor of House and Senate shortly before 1994 Congressional elections). With respect
to free trade generally, albeit partly in the context of NAFTA rather than GAT, see Judith
H. Bellow & Alan F. Holmer, U.S. Trade Law and Policy Series No. 23: Reflecting on the
NAFTA as a Turning Point in American Foreign Policy, 28 INLr'L LAw. 425, 429 (1994). The
author points out that President Clinton had put NAFTA at issue in 1994 election. Id.; see
also B. Drummond Ayrers, Jr., Perot Followers Unhappy with GOP, Look to 1996, LA.
DALY NEws, Apr. 9, 1995, at N4 (noting Perot's influence in overwhelming Republican win
in 1994 Congressional election); David E. Rosenbaum, Big Push on Trade: Lining Up the
Votes; Senators Plan Return for Vote on Trade Pact, After Elections, N.Y. Tuvms, Sept. 30,
1994, at Al (reporting Senator Hollings' tactical move to hold up Congressional recess with
GATT/NAFTA issue during 1994 Congressional election period).
9 19 U.S.C. §§ 2191-2193 (1995). See generally Harold H. Koh, Symposium: The Uruguay
Round and the Future of World Trade: The Impact of the Uruguay Round on United States
International Trade Law, 18 BROOK. J. INrr'L L. 143, 143-44 (1992) (discussing fasttrack
procedure and its perceived goals).
10 Indeed, Representative Rohrabacher's article in this volume takes particular aim at
fasttrack because the pressures that politicians can bring to bear have been changed. See
Dana Rohrabacher, Pennies for Thought: How GATT Fast Track Harms American Patent
Applicants, 11 ST. JoHN's J. LEGAL CommNT. 491, 493 (1996).
11 See, e.g., Jonathan Macey, Chicken Wars as Prisoners Dilemma: What's in a Game?,
64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 449 (1989) (describing three basic types of game theory mod-
els). See generally ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUrTION OF COOPERATION (1984) (discussing
game theory).
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their populations are to achieve the touted benefits of comparative
advantage. This discipline must be politically viable. Thus, the
purpose of GATT is to serve as an effective external discipline that
is politically safe for individual politicians to propose to their
constituents.
B. Fundamental Implementing Concepts of GATT
The way in which GATT seeks to achieve this minor miracle is
elegantly indirect. It is, I believe, this indirection that makes
GATT politically viable. Once the broad concepts have been pro-
posed to and adopted by a national population, the result in favor
of comparative advantage follows inevitably (although, as noted
above with reference to Professor Dillon's article, not necessarily
without controversy).' 2
The three implementing concepts articulated by GATT are:
Most Favored Nation (MFN), National Treatment Obligation
(NTO) and transparency. These concepts operate as a self-execut-
ing, ratchet system. Such principles were first contained in GATT
1947 and were enhanced at each of the subsequent Rounds. The
most recent changes were formalized at the end of the Uruguay
Round.13
MFN means that any member of GATT must treat all member-
nations no less well than it treats any other member. 14 This obli-
gation is automatic and generally unconditional, that is, no GATT
member can extort any concessions in exchange for equal treat-
12 Dillon, supra, note 3 at 357.
13 In order to understand the structure, appreciate that the operative document of GATT
1947 is the General Agreement, but the operative document of GATT 1994 is the Agree-
ment Establishing the World Trade Organization. The General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Trade Negotiations, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1125 [hereinafter GATT 1994]. The Uruguay
Round was concluded on Dec. 15, 1993. Id. Instruments resulting from the negotiations
included the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, opened for signature Apr. 15, 1994, GATT Doc. MTN/FN (1993), 33 I.L.M. at
1143 (1994) (whereby signatories agreed "to submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement
for the consideration of their respective competent authorities with a view to seeking ap-
proval.., and ... to adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions"); Agreement Estab-
lishing the World Trade Organization, opened for signature Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. at 1144
(entered into force Jan. 1, 1995) [hereinafter WTO Agreement]. See generally, Curtis R.
Reitz, Enforcement of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON.
L. 555, 597 (1996) (noting that drafting strategy of GATT 1994 was to expand upon GATT
1947, not replace it). Substantive obligations are contained in the annexes to that Agree-
ment. See WTO Agreement, supra, at Annex IA, 22 I.L.M. 1154.
14 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. I, Oct. 30 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. at 196-
200 [hereinafter GAT 1947].
1996]
264 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 11:259
ment of all members. This, in turn, means that when one GATT
country, in a bilateral arrangement, for example, gives a break in
tariffs to another GATT country, the first must offer that same
advantage to all members of GATT. And, like a watch, the ratchet
is one-way: once the advantage has been offered, it cannot be
taken back. MFN, in other words, is the heart of the engine that
inexorably pushes the world economies towards a unified, global
system of comparative advantage.
The second major concept of GATT is NTO. A GATT member is
forbidden from treating domestically produced goods more favora-
bly than imported goods.15 Discrimination can be blatant, by the
imposition of tariffs, for example. It can also be more subtle, for
instance, by imposing higher taxes on the sale of goods that tend
to be imported, rather than of domestic manufacture. Because
there will be domestic pressures to treat domestic goods fairly, the
NTO concept is a self-executing method of moving toward less-
ened barriers to entry of goods. And combined with MFN, the
NTO concept irreversibly spreads any benefit to all members of
GATT.
The third important concept of GATT is transparency. 16 The
idea is simple: if a member-nation imposes a limitation whose
cost the traders from other nations cannot quantify, the traders
will not be able to respond appropriately. Consequently, GATT
generally prohibits quotas because a prospective importer will not
know whether its ship will arrive in time to fit under that barrier.
Tariffs, on the other hand, are permissible so long as the taxing
nation complies with its MFN and NTO obligations, because tar-
iffs are transparent in this sense.
There are exceptions to each of these fundamental concepts. To
a significant extent, the exceptions are recognitions of the com-
bined power of MFN, NTO and transparency. In addition, they
represent a recognition of political realities. For example, it is
possible to have MFN exceptions in favor of developing coun-
tries.' 7 Otherwise, the latter would not join GATT. There are also
15 Id. art. III.
16 Id. art. XI(1). See generally Patti Goldman, The Democratization of the Development of
United States Trade Policy, 27 CoRNELL INT'L L.J. 631, 664-66, 665 n.117 (1994) (discussing
importance of United States working toward more transparent system of international
trade).
17 E.g., GATT 1947, supra note 14, art. 1(2) & Part II: Generalized System of Prefer-
ences; WTO Agreement, supra note 13, art. XI:2. Explicit under GATT 1994 in various
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exceptions when a technical violation of MFN is considered to be
favorable to the development of a unified global trade: free trade
agreements and customs unions are expressly permitted, even
though they necessarily mean that certain countries will be fa-
vored.18 If these trade arrangements were not permitted, the
power of the GATT concepts would work against the GATT pur-
pose just as surely as scaring away potential members would de-
feat GATT.
There is also a famous category of exceptions that apply in an
effort to allay the political fears of potential members. So-called
"safeguards" allow a member-nation to retaliate in specified ways
if another has violated GATT.1 9 Further, member-nations are al-
lowed to impose a special tariff, a "countervailing duty" in the
event that another nation is unfairly using its domestic strength
so as to support its exports. 20 The exception exists although the
subsidy is a reverse ratchet otherwise in violation of MFN, and is
directed against imports, otherwise in violation of NTO. Simi-
larly, the antidumping exception to the GATT fundamental con-
cepts allows selective retaliation by the imposition of a specific
duty in the event that an importer is using its individual strength,
as distinguished from the governmental power inherent in a sub-
sidy.2 Again, this duty is a violation of both MFN and NTO, but is
a protection that each nation would insist on before joining a mul-
tinational agreement, and is in furtherance of free trade and the
principles of comparative advantage.
agreements annexed to the WTO Agreement, and in the WTO Agreement itself in Art XI:2.
Id.
Is See GATT 1947, supra note 14, Part III, art. XXIV. Article XXIV sets out conditions
under which preferential trading agreements involving GATT members may qualify for an
exception from the most favored nation obligation. Id.; see also Understanding on the Inter-
pretation of Article XXIV of GATT 1994, 33 I.L.M. 28, 34. This understanding does not
change the content of article XXIV, but instead offers an assessment method for evaluating
the "general incidence of the duties and other regulations of commerce applicable before
and after the formation of a customs union." Id.
19 See GATT 1947, supra note 14, art. XIX(1); GATT 1994, supra note 13, Multilateral
Agreements on Trade in Goods, Agreement on Safeguards, art. II. The Agreement on Safe-
guards is aimed at the re-establishment of multilateral control over safeguards which are
set out in art. XIX of GATT, but not at the elimination of those safeguards. Id.
20 See GATT 1947, supra note 14, art. VI(1),(3); GATT 1994, supra note 13, Agreement
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. This agreement recognizes the need for consis-
tent resolution of disputes arising from government subsidies. Id.
21 See GATT 1947, supra note 14, art. VI(1), (2); GAIT 1994, supra note 13, Agreement
on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for
signature Apr. 15, 1994, reprinted in U.S.T.R., Final Text of GAT Uruguay Round Agree-
ments Including the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization 168 (1994).
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II. MAJOR TRENDS OF CHANGE WORKED By GATT 1994
The major trends brought about GATT are in three categories.
The first is the movement of GATT toward a more structured form
through its dispute resolution procedures. The second is GATT
1994's focused attention to so-called "non-tariff barriers" (NTBs).22
The third is the reach of GATT 1994 beyond trade in goods to
trade in services. 23 The outside authors who have contributed to
this volume, and two of the student Notes, have focused on the
first two of these trends. The third trend is obliquely touched on
by a student Note on Child Labor. The Article on Textiles serves
as a good reminder of the tension between nationalistic and global
perceptions of self-interest, and of the role that GATT plays in the
crossfire. 24
A. Dispute Resolution Procedures
The first two Articles discuss the significant impact of GATT
1994 dispute resolution procedures. Before the Uruguay Round,
GATT members arrived at decisions by consensus.25 In other
words, each country effectively had an absolute veto. What is ad-
ded by the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes (DSU) is a system of panels and appeals
that culminates in allowing the winning disputant to retaliate by
the withdrawal of concessions; 26 in other words, it is self-execut-
ing, even if the loser does not accept the result.
22 See generally THE GATT" URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HIsTORY 705, 706 [Vol. 11
(T. Stewart ed. 1993) (noting that non-tariff barriers were first formally addressed during
Tokyo Round negotiations to GATT 1947).
23 See Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, MTN/FA 11-AlA-7 in Final
Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
MTN/FA, Dec. 15, 1993, Special Distribution (UR-93-0246). Some would also include the
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) as a shift in trends. I have left
it out because it covers only measures relating to the sale of goods (see TRIMs, art. 2), and
goods have always been the focus of GATT.
24 Kitty G. Dickerson, Ph.D., Textile Trade: The GATT Exception, 11 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL
Coamwzrr. 393, 395-98 (1996).
25 See Edward Moy, Commentary: Regional Polities and Their Place in Building on Envi-
ronmental Order, 2 BUFF. ENvmL. L.J. 161, 206 (1994) (noting that sufficient political con-
sensus could result in GAT art. XXV-type waiver as opposed to majority vote).
26 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes [DSU],
in Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotia-
tions, Dec. 15, 1993, art. 22(3), 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1130 (1994).
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B. Non-Tariff Barriers
GATT 1994 was the result of the most recent set of discussions,
the Uruguay Round. Its major theme, a subtheme of the overall
GATT, was to address the NTBs. The earlier rounds of GATT, by
their application of the MFN, NTO and transparency fundamental
concepts, had significantly reduced the use of trade barriers in the
form of tariffs. What the Uruguay Round turned to, then, was
non-tariff barriers that have the same impact as tariffs.
Environmental regulations are an example. The United States
is frequently accused of using its stiff environmental regulations
as a means of keeping imports out. A recent example involved
Venezuela's successful use of the World Trade Organization's dis-
pute resolution procedures to complain that U.S. regulations con-
cerning the purity of petroleum products were in fact a trade bar-
rier violative of GATT.27 Professor Dillon's article is an interesting
perspective, suggesting that GATT may be an inappropriate vehi-
cle for protection of the environment.
Intellectual property has long fallen into the sphere in which
NTB abuses occur. The developed countries accuse the developing
countries of allowing the theft of intellectual property as a means
of acquiring valuable know-how. The fear of losing control over
their intellectual property has been a deterrent to exports by pro-
ducers in developed countries. These issues of protecting intellec-
tual property are of particular importance to the United States
and have been one more vehicle for discussing national sover-
eignty in the face of GATT. We are fortunate to have five Articles
and a student Note that consider various aspects of these issues.
Finally, this volume also includes a student Note on the extent
of the safeguards available to United States producers pursuant to
the legislation that adopted GATT 1994 for this country. Not only
does the Note concern NTBs, but it also predicts application of the
WTO's dispute resolution procedures.
27 See, e.g., Richard W. Stevenson, U.S. to Honor Trade Ruling Against It on Foreign
Fuel, N.Y. Tims, June 20, 1996, at D4 (reporting that United States would honor adverse
ruling after trade panel found that American environmental laws unfairly discriminated
against gasoline imported from Venezuela and Brazil).
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C. GATS
The "G" in GATT could stand for "goods" if it did not stand for
"general." Another of the agreements included in GATT 1994 is
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). The pur-
pose of GATS is to regulate services, not goods. For this reason it
is a radical extension of the GATT principles: the "G" in GATS
stands only for "general."28 Cynically, GATS exists today because,
increasingly, it is services rather than goods that the developing
countries are exporting. The familiar fundamental concepts of
GATT apply to GATS too: MFN 29 and transparency (any limita-
tions have to be published).3 0 NTO, however, applies not by de-
fault, but only if specifically included.3 1 This difference, and a par-
ticular exception to MFN, reflects the unhappiness of the United
States with portions of GATS. Basically, the United States wants
to be able to treat foreign service-providers less well than domes-
tic ones. 2
What has not been touched by GATS directly, or by GATT
through reference to goods illegally produced, is child labor. This
is a difficult problem and the arguments in favor of not banning
child labor through multilateral agreements such as GATS or
GATT have included varying cultural norms3 3 and economic reali-
ties of developing economies. 4 It will be interesting to see how the
28 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Multilateral Trade Negotiations (the Uru-
guay Round): General Agreement on Trade in Services [hereinafter GATS], Dec. 15, 1993,
art. I(1), 33 I.L.M. 44, 48.
29 Id. art. II.
30 Id. art. III.
31 Id. art. XVII.
32 To this extent, MFN has been made conditional, a radical change from GATT. For
example, the United States in its GATT statute, 19 U.S.C. § 3555(a), [§ 135(a) in Bill] speci-
fies that it has the right to exclude financial services from MFN treatment. The reason is
that United States treatment of foreign financial service-providers has been better than
that of other countries, and the United States does not want foreign countries to be able to
continue to be less generous to United States financial institutions than the latter are to
foreign ones. See, e.g., Statement of Administrative Action, submitted to Congress by the
Executive, in compliance with Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L.
100-418, § 1103, 102 Stat. 107, at the time when the bill was submitted to Congress, at it
applies to GATS, at 297, 309.
33 See Daniel S. Ehrenberg, The Labor Link: Applying the International Trading System
to Enforce Violations of Forced and Child Labor, 20 YALE J. INT'L L. 361, 403 (1995) (stat-
ing that GATT provisions on unfair trading practices could be interpreted to prohibit use of
child labor).
34 See Barbara B. Woodhouse, 'Who Owns the Child?": Meyer and Pierce and the Child
as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 995, 1060 (1992) (noting that child labor in United
States in early 19th century was part of family's economic scheme; this scheme was in-
creasingly condemned in United States in 20th century).
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apparently disparate issues of child labor and of financial institu-
tions are resolved in future Rounds.
III. CONCLUSION
GATT 1994 is a supremely practical document in support of a
particular ideal. The genius of GATT 1994 is in its pragmatism: it
recognizes that the politicians have to be separated from any neg-
ative short-term consequences of GATT's support of free trade if
they are to view it in their self interest to support their nation's
adoption of GATT 1994. GATT recognizes that in order to be effec-
tive, the politicians must further be separated from the implemen-
tation of GATT 1994's policies, especially when the policies pre-
vent the nation from acting in its short-term opportunistic
interest. Separation of the politicians, then, is the common
thread. GATT 1994 achieves this result in the adoption phase by
allowing the politicians, whose time-horizon can be viewed as the
interval between elections, to tout the perceived advantages of
free trade while projected negative consequences, such as job dis-
locations, will be felt after the relevant election. It achieves the
separation in the implementation phase by creating a system that
changes the basic calculus. Because of GATT 1994, it is no longer
in a member-nation's short-term interest to act opportunistically:
one member-nation's bad acts will lead virtually inevitably and
automatically to costly retaliation.
Given the effectiveness of GATT 1994's practical side and there-
fore its effectiveness in promoting its ideal of global free trade, it is
imperative to consider afresh whether the global free-trade ideal
of that system is defensible. It is particularly important to do so
since GATT 1994 continues the trajectory of the underlying phi-
losophy beyond the elimination of tariffs and even beyond barriers
to trade in goods alone. Late in 1994, the new head of GATT's
organization predicted that, by the year 2005, the aggregate an-
nual income gain derived from GATT 1994 by the world economy
would be US $510 billion. 35 Even if that assertion proves true, we
must nevertheless ask whether free trade is an appropriate goal
because this gain is not costless. Therefore, as do the authors of
this issue, we must continue to question the trade-offs between
35 Paul Lewis, Top International Trade Official Urges U.S. to Approve Accord, N.Y.
Tmms, Nov. 22, 1994, at A20.
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free trade and sovereignty, and between the power of the devel-
oped countries and the needs of the developing countries. We
must, in short, follow our authors' lead as they question whether
comparative advantage is an appropriate justification for free
trade.
